Vol. 9 (2024): Discrecionalidad y deferencia
Artículos

Delegación y deferencia: reflexiones desde una perspectiva económica del Derecho de sociedades

PDF (Español (España)) HTML (Español (España))
  • Maribel Sáez Lacave
Maribel Sáez Lacave
UAM
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37417/RDP/vol_9_2024_2158

Published 2024-05-31

Keywords

  • relación principal-agente,
  • incentivos,
  • información asimétrica,
  • deferencia,
  • discrecionalidad,
  • análisis económico del Derecho,
  • Derecho societario
    • ...More
    Less

How to Cite

Sáez Lacave, M. (2024). Delegación y deferencia: reflexiones desde una perspectiva económica del Derecho de sociedades. Journal of Public Law: Theory and Methods, 9, 87–108. https://doi.org/10.37417/RDP/vol_9_2024_2158

Copyright (c) 2024 Maribel Sáez Lacave

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Authors retain copyright in the published paper and only license to the publisher a non-exclusive right to first publication and distribution of the published work

Abstract

This paper proposes an approach to judicial deference through the economic model of delegation. In an asymmetric information environment, there is a trade-off between discretion and deference in ex post monitoring. The delegation that gives rise to the principal-agent relationship produces costs, but also benefits. Moreover, even when strict or non-deferential ex post control by shareholders is efficient, it constitutes ex ante a threat of expropriation, which reduces managerial initiative and non-contractual investments. Judicial review can also be analyzed in this way. Strict judicial review is not always the most desirable option, because there are decisions in which it is more beneficial to ensure an area of discretion or impunity. However, the effective way to deal with the principal-agent relationship is not through judicial review, but through contractual incentives.

PDF (Español (España)) HTML (Español (España))

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

  1. Philippe AGHION y Patrick BOLTON, “An Incomplete Contract Approach to Financial Contracting,” Review of Economic Studies, LIX, 1992, pp. 473-94. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297860
  2. Philippe AGHION y Jean TIROLE, “Formal and real authority in organizations”, 105(1), Journal of Political Economy, 1997, pp. 1-29. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/262063
  3. Philippe AGHION y R. HOLDEN, “Incomplete contracts and the theory of the firm: what have we learned over the past 25 years?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25, 2011, pp. 181-197. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.25.2.181
  4. Armen ALCHIAN y Harold DEMSETZ, “Production, information costs, and economic organization”, American Economic Review, 62(5), 1972, pp. 777-795.
  5. William T. ALLEN, Jack B. JACOBS y Leo E. STRINE, “Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law”, The Business Lawyer, 56, 2001, pp. 1287-1321.
  6. Kenneth J. ARROW, “The economics of agency”, in J. PRATT y R. ZECKERHAUSER (eds.), Principals and agents: the structure of business, Boston, Harvard Business School Press.
  7. Robert P. BARLETT y Eric L. TALLEY, “Law and Corporate Governance”, en Benjamin HERMALIN y Richard WEISBACH (eds.), The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, vol. 1, Amsterdam, 2017, pp. 177- 234. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hecg.2017.11.009
  8. Lucian BEBCHUK, Alma COHEN y Allen FERRELL, “What Matters in Corporate Governance?”, Review of Financial Studies, 22(2), 2009, pp. 783-827. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn099
  9. Adolf BERLE y Gardiner MEANS, The modern corporation and private property, New York, Macmillan, 1932.
  10. Mike BURKART, Denis GROMB y Fausto PANUNZI, “Large shareholders, monitoring, and the value of the firm”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(3), 1997, pp. 693–728. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555325
  11. Melvin Aron EISENBERG, “The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law”, Fordham Law Review, 62, 1993, pp. 437 y ss.
  12. Eugene FAMA, “Agency problems and the theory of the firm”, Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 1980, pp. 288-307. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/260866
  13. Eugene FAMA y Michael JENSEN, “Separation of ownership and control”, Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 1983, pp. 301-325. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/467037
  14. Nuno GAROUPA y Jud MATHEWS,” Strategic Delegation, Discretion, and Deference: Explaining the Comparative Law of Administrative Review”, American Journal of Comparative Law, 62(1), 2014, pp. 1-33. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5131/AJCL.2013.0013
  15. Franklin A. GEVURTZ, “The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?”, California Law Review, 67, 1994, pp. 287 y ss.
  16. Robert GIBBONS, “Lecture Note 1. Agency theory”,
  17. https://web.mit.edu/rgibbons/www/903%20LN%201%20S10.pdf
  18. Bengt HOLMSTROM, “On the theory of delegation”, No 438, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, 1980.
  19. http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/438.pdf
  20. Michael JENSEN y William MECKLING, “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 1976, pp. 305-360. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
  21. Simon JOHNSON, Rafael LA PORTA, Florencio LOPEZ DE SILANES y Andrei SHLEIFER, “Tunnelling”, American Economic Review, 90, 2000, pp. 22-27. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.2.22
  22. Benjamin KLEIN, “The Hold-Up Problem”, en Peter NEWMAN (ed.), The new Palgrave dictionary of economics and the law, Macmillan Reference Limited, 1998, pp. 241 ss.
  23. Benjamin KLEIN, Robert CRAWDFORD y Armen ALCHIAN, “Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process”, Journal of Law and Economics, 21(2), 1978, pp. 297-326. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/466922
  24. Thomas KUHN, La estructura de las revoluciones científicas, Fondo de cultura económica, México 1971.
  25. Rafael LA PORTA, Florencio LOPEZ DE SILANES, y Andrei SHLEIFER. “Corporate Ownership Around the World”, Journal of Finance, 54, 1999, pp. 471-517. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00115
  26. Aurelio MENÉNDEZ MENÉNDEZ y Ángel ROJO FERNÁNDEZ-RIO, Lecciones de Derecho Mercantil, Aranzadi, Cizur Menor, 2018, vol. I.
  27. Douglass C. NORTH. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
  28. Cándido PAZ-ARES, “La responsabilidad de los administradores como instrumento de gobierno corporativo”, InDret, 4, 2003.
  29. Mitchell POLINSKI y Steven SHAVEL, “The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law”, Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 2000, pp. 45-76. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.38.1.45
  30. Maribel SÁEZ y María GUTIÉRREZ, “The law and economics of comparative corporate law”, en A. AFSHARIPOUR y M. GELTER (ed.), Comparative corporate governance, Cheltenham, UK- Northhampton, MA, USA, 2021, pp. 56 y ss.
  31. Fernando SÁNCHEZ CALERO, Principios de Derecho Mercantil, Aranzadi Cizur Menor, 2018, vol. I.
  32. Karsten SCHMIDT, Gesellsahaftsrecht, Köln, 1986.
  33. Oliver WILLIAMSON, “The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(3), 2002, 171-195. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/089533002760278776

Update cookies preferences